INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, the mandatory death penalty ("MDP") in the Commonwealth Caribbean 2 has evolved due to recurrent scrutiny at the national and regional levels. While undoubtedly the judicial erosion of the MDP marks an impressive human rights trend in the region, the trajectory of this change has been complex and frequently discussed. 3 The proceedings of The Barbados led to a decision by the JCPC 9 and a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") 10 that later resulted in a judgment by the Inter-American Court.
11
At about the same time that the Commission's petition was submitted to the Inter-American Court, a second set of appeals involving procedural issues in the case were being presented to the newly inaugurated CCJ 12 . As a second stage in the appeals process, the Boyce and Joseph Cases afforded the CCJ with the opportunity to re-examine the constitutional and procedural issues underlying the MDP and the interaction of these issues with international treaty obligations. Moreover, the CCJ judgment sought to resolve ongoing tensions between international obligations and domestic law in a manner that re-asserted respect for domestic sovereignty as a cornerstone of post-independence Caribbean jurisprudence while enabling responsiveness to changing applications of international human rights norms. 13 As such, the CCJ Joseph-Boyce Case provides an extensive overview of the MDP in the Commonwealth Caribbean and accordingly affords both an understanding of legal history in the region and provides insight into the forces and causes that continue to shape the region's emerging jurisprudence.
14 Due to its historical entrenchment, the law dealing with the MDP has engendered significant evolutionary cornerstones in the Commonwealth Caribbean jurisprudence. Thus, the CCJ, through its exploration of these evolving legal norms, has worked to reconcile the constitutional idiosyncrasies and treaty obligations that have framed MDP issues in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
of procedural fairness in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy; and (3) the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty).
9. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5. 10. See Boyce v. Barbados, Case 12.480, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. (2006) . 11. Boyce et al., supra note 7, at 8. 12. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 1. 13. The lengthy procedural path of these cases and the resulting exploration of death penalty jurisprudence provides insights into: (1) the historical and constitutional nuances of the Commonwealth Caribbean Legal System; (2) the reasons that Caribbean nations seek to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with the Caribbean Court of Justice; and (3) human rights evolution that resulted from the reconciling the mandatory death sentence with changing legal norms. An excellent resource for the discussion of the historical roots of the Commonwealth Caribbean Legal System can be found in Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems (2008) .
14. For a discussion of the development and use of the term "Commonwealth Caribbean Jurisprudence," see McCoy, supra note 3, at 2-6.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE BOYCE-JOSEPH CASES:
An understanding of the legal importance of CCJ JosephBoyce Case requires an overview of the background and procedural history of the proceedings in this matter. Following the conviction of Boyce and Joseph in February 2001, the first series of appeals ended in 2004 with the JCPC sitting in London as the final court of appeal. 15 The second set of appeals ended with a decision by CCJ established in April 2005 in Port of Spain, Trinidad.
16
As this second group of appeals was being completed, Boyce and Joseph also petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2004 and received a judgment from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2007. The factual background underlying this complex procedural history is also quite compelling.
The Joseph-Boyce Case began with an unfortunate altercation between two young men. On April 10, 1999, Marquelle Hippolyte ("Hippolyte") had a disagreement on a bus with Rodney Murray ("Murray"). After Hippolyte left the bus, Murray was hit by a rock thrown by Hippolyte or one of his friends. Later that day, Hippolyte was pursued after being spotted on a basketball court and was brutally beaten with rocks and wood planks in a planned retaliation. The attackers were Murray, Romain Bend ("Bend"), Jeffrey Joseph ("Joseph"), and Lennox Ricardo Boyce ("Boyce). Despite extensive medical treatment, Hippolyte later died on April 15, 1999, from a brain hemorrhage and shock. 17 Justice Wit noted in his opinion that "The other two, the respondents, opted to be tried on a charge of murder on the basis of a not guilty plea. They were convicted for murder and subsequently and automatically sentenced to death. There are no facts to suggest that the involvement of the respondents in the crime was more serious than that of the other two. Joseph did have a criminal record, but an unimpressive one. Boyce had no criminal record whatsoever. Reports by the prison authorities on their behavior were in neither case unfavorable. The only relevant difference between the respondents and their fellow accused seems to be that the latter spared the Crown the time and costs of a trial." Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 4 (Wit, J., concurring The Commission, at its motion, and the Court, have dealt with the practice of the obligatory imposition of the death penalty upon conviction for murder in a number of countries in the Caribbean and have concluded that its automatic imposition, without considering the individual circumstances of the offense or the offender, is incompatible with the rights to life, humane treatment, and due process. The standards developed as a result, and the interaction between the inter-American human rights bodies and the judicial bodies of the Commonwealth Caribbean, have given rise to unprecedented changes in law and policy. At present, only two of those countries retain the mandatory death penalty, and one of those is in the process of reforming it in compliance with decisions of the organs of the Inter-American System.").
28. 41 Accordingly, the MDP for murder was preserved by including "existing law" or "savings law" clauses in the Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions. 42 Without those clauses, imposing a sentence of death without considering mitigating circumstances at trial could be found to be "inhuman or degrading punishment" in contravention of the fundamental rights and freedoms provisions expressed in their constitutions adopted at independence. 43 By Constitution, mitigating circumstances in mandatory death sentence cases are considered post-trial. 44 As the representative of Her Majesty the Queen, the Governor-General 45 makes the decision on whether (1) jurisdictions of the Commonwealth Caribbean, except Belize, to preserve the colonial status quo from constitutional challenge. Either they rule out altogether any constitutional attack on the laws in existence at the time of independence, or they at least prohibit any attack on the specific colonial penalties or punishments in existence at the time of independence based on the alleged cruelty or inhumanity of those punishments.").
43. See Boyce and Joseph, supra note 5, at ¶ 74; see also Simmons, supra note 3, at 264-65 (2000) ("The right to life is guaranteed in Section 11 of Chapter III of the Constitution of Barbados, which is devoted to provisions for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. This right to life is, however, subject to limitations. Section 11 specifically provides that the limitations are 'designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.' In other words, the right to life must yield to a competing public interest in certain circumstances. Chapter III was greatly influenced by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953 (2) to exercise the prerogative of mercy to (a) grant clemency, or (b) commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. 46 In making that decision, the Governor-General is advised by a non-judicial appointed body known as the Privy Council. 47 Moreover, an "ouster clause" in the Barbados Constitution purportedly shielded Privy Council decisions from judicial review. 48 These inherited colonial laws and institutions that preserve the MDP in the Commonwealth Caribbean began to garner the attention of the international human rights community, and as a result, these governments felt pressured to conform to international human rights obligations in domestic proceedings. Thus, the Joseph and Boyce cases show the contours of the judicial erosion of the colonial jurisprudential relics of MDP in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the invocation of more innovative jurisprudential trends. 49 49. See Harrington, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that "[t]he mandatory death penalty is a colonial legacy. Under the common law of England, death was the only sentence that could be pronounced by judge upon a defendant who was convicted of murder, regardless of the nature of the offense or the particular circumstances of the offender. Through colonialism, this simple and undiscriminating rule was applied to many of Britain's colonies, and upon independence, the nations of the Commonwealth Caribbean preserved the rule that was in place as part of their colonial inheritance." (citations omitted)).
the Commonwealth Caribbean countries ran afoul of the human rights principles embodied in their constitutions at independence.
50
To make that determination, the JCPC examined whether the "pre-existing laws" provisions or "savings clause" in the respective Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions adequately shielded their MDP laws from constitutional scrutiny.
51
In three cases in 2002 and a fourth in 2003, the JCPC opined that MDP sentences were unconstitutional in four Commonwealth Caribbean nations. In Reyes v. The Queen, the Board stated that "[t]o deny the offender the opportunity, before sentence is passed, to seek to persuade the court that in all the circumstances to condemn him to death would be disproportionate and inappropriate is to treat him as no human being should be treated and thus to deny his basic humanity. . ."
52 Along these lines, the JCPC upheld the death penalty, but not as a mandatory sentence. in Boyce and Joseph held that the MDP in Barbados was, in fact, enforceable due to the existing law provision in the Barbados Constitution. 57 The "saving of existing law" provision in section 26 of the Barbados Constitution protects written laws enacted prior to independence even when those laws are modified. 58 The majority explained that the MDP was written into section 2 of the Barbados Offences Against the Person Act 1868, which reads in part, "whosoever shall be convicted of murder shall suffer death as a felon." 59 After independence in 1966, the Offences Against the Person Act 1994 replaced the 1868 act. 60 Thus, the MDP in the 1994 act was protected as existing law even though the Board found that it was not consistent with the constitutional prohibition against inhuman and degrading punishment. 61 The majority also noted that "the mandatory death penalty is inconsistent with the international obligations of Barbados" but that those obligations do not "have any direct effect upon the domestic law of Barbados."
62 Accordingly, the majority recognized that preserving the MDP was contrary to evolving international norms. 57 . Id. ¶ 6. 58. The saving of existing law provision in section 26 of the Barbados Constitution reads: "1. Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any written law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any provision of sections 12 to 23 to the extent that the law in questiona. is a law (in this section referred to as 'an existing law') that was enacted or made before 30th November 1966 and has continued to be part of the law of Barbados at all times since that day; b. repeals and re-enacts an existing law without alteration; or c. alters an existing law and does not thereby render that law inconsistent with any provision of sections 12 to 23 in a manner in which, or to an extent to which, it was not previously so inconsistent. 2. In subsection (1)(c) the reference to altering and existing law includes references to repealing it and re-enacting it with modifications or making different provisions in lieu thereof, and to modifying it; and in subsection (1) 'written law' includes any instrument having the force of law and in this subsection and subsection (1) references to the repeal and re-enactment of an existing law shall be construed accordingly." 59. Relevant language from the 1868 statute reads "whosoever shall be convicted of murder shall suffer death as a felon." Id. With respect to the majority's interpretation of the existing law provision and the preservation of the mandatory death sentence, the dissenting Lordships stated: This is no doubt a possible reading of these provisions. But it is not the only possible reading. Nor, in our opinion, is it the preferable reading. It puts a narrow and over-literal construction on the words used, gives little or no weight to the principles which should guide the approach to interpretation of constitutional provisions, gives little or no weight to the human rights guarantees which the people of Barbados intended to embed in their Constitution and puts Barbados in flagrant breach of its international obligations. 63 To remedy those transgressions, the dissenting Lordships explained that "we would modify section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1994 by substituting 'may' for 'shall.' "
64
The majority and dissenting opinion in Matthew divided along the same lines as the Boyce and Joseph case. Lord Hoffman writing for the majority explained:
In its judgment delivered today in Boyce and Joseph v. The Queen the Board has rejected the reasoning in Roodal and decided that the law imposing a mandatory death penalty for murder in Barbados remains valid. Their Lordships do not propose to repeat all that was said in their judgment in that case, to which reference should be made. They will confine themselves to setting out the relevant legislation in Trinidad and Tobago and explaining why the reasoning in Boyce and Joseph v. The Queen also leads to the conclusion that the law imposing the mandatory death penalty for murder in Trinidad and Tobago remains valid. 65 Thus, the majority in Matthew plainly stated that this 2004 decision expressly overruled its 2003 decision in Roodal, consequently reinstating the MDP in Trinidad and Tobago. 66 On the basis of the majority decisions Boyce and Joseph and Matthew, it would not have been surprising if the JCPC had also upheld the MDP law in Jamaica. What was perplexing to those who did follow the reasoning in these cases is why the JCPC decided not to uphold MDP in Jamaica.
In In the 1992 act, the mandatory death sentence was limited to cases of "capital murder" or multiple "non-capital" murders. In examining the new law, the JCPC found that the MDP for repeat non-capital murder was not "existing law" and therefore the MDP set forth in that part of the act was unconstitutional. As a result, the 1992 act would be read to authorize, but not require the death penalty for non-capital murder.
These strange constructions are difficult to explain and understand. On the one hand, the JCPC has upheld MDP even though it is contrary to the provisions of Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions and evolving international norms. On the other hand, the JCPC recognized that the continued application of saving law or existing law clauses has a petrifying effect on the evolution of fundamental rights and has stalled the application of constitutional and international principles to the MDP. Thus, the JCPC's decisions show the difficulty in applying the existing law clauses in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The questions of what law existed and whether it is preserved after amendment is not simple. In particular, the notion of preserving the validity of colonial, antiquated laws seems to grate against the development of post-independence legal systems. While the JCPC has had some difficulty balancing the conflicting considerations in the Commonwealth Caribbean norms, the CCJ has worked to strike a more comprehensible balance between the constraints of an inherited colonial legal system and progressive notions of fundamental rights. A period of five years following sentence was established as a reasonable, though not by any means inflexible, time-69. Simmons, supra note 3, at 271 ("[t]he immediate result of the decision in Pratt was that all Caribbean jurisdictions, which had prisoners on death row in excess of five years, had to commute their sentences to life imprisonment").
70. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 15. In addition, the Justices observed that "the time permitted by Pratt for their execution has already expired and the commutation of their death sentences is no longer challenged. However, the matter is too important and too contentious to shelve on that basis. It was fully argued in the courts below and before us and the parties are entitled to have our ruling on it." Id. 73. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ ¶ 45-46. The Justices noted that "[t]he decision caused disruption in national and regional justice systems. Its effect was that, in one fell swoop, all persons on death row for longer than five years were automatically entitled to have, and had, their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. In Jamaica there were 105 such prisoners, in Trinidad & Tobago 53, and in Barbados 9." Id. limit within which the entire post-sentence legal process should be completed and the execution carried out. If execution was not carried out within that time-frame, there was a strong likelihood that the court would regard the delay as amounting to inhuman treatment and commute the death sentence to one of life imprisonment.
74
Within the Pratt case, the JCPC had allotted two years for "the entire appellate process" and another eighteen months "for applications to international bodies."
75 Despite the initial impact of these time limits, the CCJ opted to uphold the five-year timelimit established in Pratt by noting "[w]e respectfully endorse without reservation the proposition that the practice of keeping persons on death row for inordinate periods of time, is unacceptable and infringes constitutional provisions that guarantee humane treatment."
76
The two Justices also examined the timing dilemma created by the Lewis case. According to the Justices: the JCPC decided inter alia, that, where a State has ratified a treaty conferring on individuals the right to petition an international human rights body, a person sentenced to death by a court of that State is entitled by virtue of his constitutional right to the protection of the law, to require that the sentence of death passed on him be not carried out until his petition to the human rights body has been finally disposed of and the report of that body is available for consideration by the State authority charged with exercising the prerogative of mercy.
77
Given that the international obligations identified in Lewis must also be satisfied within the Pratt deadlines, the resulting procedural hurdles were more difficult to clear because the state has "no control over the pace of proceedings before the relevant international human rights body."
78
Despite the political fallout and debate sparked by Pratt and Lewis, ultimately, the CCJ declined to overrule the Pratt decision. 79 Instead, the de la Bastide and Saunders opinion indicated that proceedings protected by Lewis could exceed the specified 74 eighteen-month period and the overall five-year limit in Pratt. Thus, flexibility in the application these deadlines would be permitted if "the additional time taken is not attributable to delays in the process for which the Government concerned is responsible."
80
The CCJ also addressed whether the Barbados Court of Appeal was correct in its decision to commute the death sentence in the Joseph-Boyce appeal of the BPC attempt to act prior to a petition to the Inter-American Commission. The Justices agreed that commutation was appropriate because to resort to the InterAmerican Court would have "taken the case over the five-year limit set in Pratt, as applied in Lewis, both of which were at the material time the law of Barbados."
81 Even if the CCJ had overturned precedent to extend the Pratt and Lewis timelines, the Justices opined that they could not re-impose the sentence of death. In explaining this decision, the Justices stated that another set of expectations arises when, by application of a court decision, a death sentence is commuted. The "special features of [this] expectation" are as follows, Firstly, it is the expectation of a person under sentence of death. Secondly, it is an expectation created not by the Executive, but by a court decision which is subsequently reversed. Thirdly, the expectation is that the condemned man will be given a chance (however slim) of avoiding being put to death. To deny the condemned man that chance was deemed so unfair as to render the carrying out of the death sentence cruel and, therefore, unconstitutional.
82
Thus, the CCJ opined that Barbados correctly conceded the commutation of the death penalty in accordance with the decision of the Barbados Court of Appeals. in order to be heard by the Inter-American Court. These actions of the BPC after the JCPC decision on the constitutionality of the MDP resulted in the Boyce and Joseph case being appealed to the CCJ. The three issues before the CCJ were (1) whether the BPC's decision subject to judicial review; (2) whether the BPC's failure to await the outcome of the petition to the Inter-American Commission violated Joseph's and Boyce's right to protection under the law and (3) whether the Barbados Constitution allowed the Court of Appeals to commute a death sentence and if so whether the factors considered were appropriate.
84
In 2002, Barbados had amended its constitution to allow the BPC, among other things, (1) to set deadlines for appeals to or consultations with institutions or persons outside the Barbados appellate process and (2) to exercise its functions before the completion of those appeals or consultations. 85 As noted by the CCJ, "these amendments were prompted by dissatisfaction on the part of the people of Barbados with certain decisions of the JCPC and the resolve of the Barbados Parliament to restrict at least, if not negate, the effects of these decisions."
86 Applying these amendments, the BPC met and advised against the commutation of the death sentence before the Inter-American Commission had acted on the Boyce-Joseph petition.
87
In reviewing the acts of the BPC, both the High Court and the Court of Appeals in Barbados found that the BPC could not meet before the conclusion of the Commission's proceedings. Moreover, the Court of Appeals also indicated that courts could set aside the BPC decisions or have declared them null.
88
The decision by the Barbados Court of Appeals raised the question of whether the BPC decisions about the exercise the prerogative of mercy were subject to judicial review. Section 77(4) of the Barbados Constitution, known as the "ouster clause", provides that: "[t]he question whether the Privy Council has validly performed any function vested in it by this Constitution shall not be inquired into by any court." 89 In addition, earlier JCPC cases indicated that since "mercy was not the subject of legal rights . . . the 84. Id. ¶ 11. 85. BARB. CONST. § 78 (6). 86. Joseph, supra note 4, at ¶ 23. 87. The CCJ also noted that Boyce and Joseph "were convicted and sentenced before the amendments came into force but it was submitted in writing on their behalf that the new sub-sections applied to them." Id.
88. Id. ¶ 9. 89. BARB. CONST. § 77 (4). prerogative of mercy was therefore not subject to review by the courts." 90 President de la Bastide and Justice Saunders noted that shielding the exercise of the prerogative of mercy from judicial review runs contrary to "the modern approach to human rights with its emphasis on procedural fairness." 91 In addition, they observed that more recent JCPC decisions have found that "the processes involved in the exercise of mercy were not beyond review by the courts." 92 The Justices indicated their approval of this view by explaining:
We agree with those who regard the power to confirm or commute a death sentence, particularly a mandatory one, as far too important to permit those in whom it is vested freedom to exercise that power without any possibility of judicial review even if they commit breaches of basic rules of procedural fairness.
93
In addition, the ouster clause, in Section 77(4), did not preclude judicial review of BPC actions. President de la Bastide and Justice Saunders concluded that "the presence of such ouster clauses [will not deter courts] from inquiring into whether a body has performed its functions in contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and in particular the right to procedural fairness." Thus, judicial review is appropriate when the procedures of the BPC affect procedural fairness and could result in the "breach of the respondents' right to the protection of the law, one of the fundamental human rights." 91. Id. ¶ 30. The Justices added: "In light of these developments, the exercise of the prerogative of mercy has fallen under greater scrutiny, especially in those states whose Constitutions permit, or specifically sanction, retention of the mandatory death penalty for the crime of murder. The occasion on which the prerogative of mercy is exercised is the final, and in mandatory death penalty regimes, the only, opportunity a convicted murderer has to point to the particular circumstances of his case and to argue by reference to them that he should not be executed. Whether he is or is not ultimately put to death by the State depends not just on the substantive exercise of the prerogative of mercy but also on the procedures governing and leading up to its exercise. The quality and nature of the advice given to the Governor-General bear a direct relationship to the quality and nature of the process followed by the BPC in coming to its decision. court "to examine the judgments of the JCPC that specifically address the position of a condemned man seeking to take advantage of provisions in a ratified but unincorporated human rights treaty." 95 To address this issue, the CCJ identified the legitimate expectation doctrine as a means to establish the legal impact of unincorporated treaty obligations.
96
After reviewing a number of cases concerning the effect of unincorporated treaties on domestic law, the CCJ found that it was the government's statements and actions that created a legitimate expectation that the BPC would await the outcome the Inter-American Court proceedings. The court opined that "the facts and circumstances that could have given rise to the legitimate expectation" included "[1] the fact that Barbados had ratified the ACHR, [2] positive statements . . . made by representatives of the Executive authority . . . to abide by that treaty . . . [and] [3] the practice of the Barbados Government to give an opportunity to condemned men to have their petitions to the international human rights body processed before proceeding to execution." 97 The court stated that accordingly, "[i]n all these circumstances we would hold that the respondents had a legitimate expectation that the State would not execute them without first allowing them a reasonable time within which to complete the proceedings they had initiated under the ACHR by petition to the Commission." 98 Justices de la Bastide and Saunders likened the denial of a legitimate expectation to an abuse of discretion or a lack of fairness. Along these lines, the Justices created a balancing test to determine whether or not a legitimate expectation has risen. In this test, "[t]he court must weigh the competing interests of the individual . . . and that of the public authority . . . [and] must make an assessment of how to strike the balance or be prepared to review the fairness of any such assessment . . . previously [made] by the public authority." 99 In applying this balancing test to the facts in the Boyce case, the court explained,
In the case before us, there is on the one hand the legitimate expectation of the condemned men that they will be permitted a reasonable time to pursue their petitions with the Commission . . .. On the other hand, there is whatever the State may advance as an overriding interest in refusing to await completion of the international process before carrying out the death sentence. . ..
[A]part from the constraints of the Pratt time-limit, the State of Barbados claims no overriding interest in putting the condemned men to death without allowing their legitimate expectation to be fulfilled.
100
The Justices also noted the respondents' legitimate expectation that the procedure "allowed a reasonable time to pursue their petitions and receive a favorable' report from the international body" but did not include an expectation that "the BPC [would] abide by the recommendations in the report."
101 Significantly, the CCJ limited the legitimate expectation approach as a means of invoking unincorporated treaty rights. The Justices stated that "the doctrine of legitimate expectation in this case is rooted in a number of considerations" including "the desirability of giving the condemned man every opportunity to secure the commutation of his sentence, the direct access which the treaty affords him to the international law process and the disproportion between giving effect to the State's interest in avoiding delay . . . and the finality of an execution." 102 
CONCLUSION
As shown in the Boyce-Joseph Cases, the MDP in Barbados is constitutional, but subject to significant domestic and international safeguards. While the Barbadian MDP is preserved by the savings law provision in Section 26 of the Barbados Constitution, the implementation this sentence invokes a number of post-sentencing protections. Thus both the JCPC and CCJ have shown that international obligations may be considered in the meticulous judicial mechanics of the MDP. These obligations constrain the actions of the Barbados Privy Council and serve to alleviate the nullification of fundamental rights under the savings clause provisions. As a result, the JCPC and now the CCJ have forged the time limitations on domestic appeals and upheld the right to appeal to international bodies in an effort to ensure procedural integrity of the MDP. 
